| Sustainable Energy
Options African Case Examples of What Works & Possible Interventions for Parliaments |
| Opposite ends of Spectrum: Small scale and improved biomass cookstove example from Kenya (perceived as an access option to more efficient option) & more advanced large-scale cogeneration experience in Mauritius | |||
| Brief Discussion of Case Studies: Key achievements and results | |||
| Policy lessons learned: Could provide basis for ParliamentÕs interventions. | |||
| Improved Efficient Charcoal Kenya Ceramic Jiko (KCJ) |
| Adaptation of a clay-line bucket stove design from Thailand | |
| Reduces charcoal consumption by 30-50% | |
| In use in over 80% of urban households in Kenya (16% of rural homes) - cumulative production now over 15 million | |
| Fully self-sustaining using locally produced materials and skills – generated jobs & new enterprises | |
| KCJ in use in Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi & Senegal & being introduced in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Ghana and Madagascar |
| KCJ – Policy/Strategy Elements |
| Good Data Base: Ministry of Energy/Beijer Institute Survey, NGOs and research institutes | |||
| Micro-level de-regulation: Government allowed informal sector space/freedom and did not attempt to over-regulate. Eased up on taxes and licenses | |||
| Provided Minimum Infrastructure: A simple shed and basic sewage amenities. Access to electricity & public lighting would transform the KCJ industry. | |||
| Training & Adaptation Research Support: Most of required technologies in public domain with proven experiences in Asia and Latin America. Modest training and research support to adapt technologies to local conditions is all that is needed. | |||
| Policy
Lessons Learned Could Provide Basis for Interventions by Parliament |
| Importance of Small-Scale/Informal Manufacturing/Assembly Sector: Can account for up 30-40% of jobs. In absence of formal sector employment growth, often only major source of jobs for rapidly growing pool of unemployed youth. Less troublesome than informal trading sector. Resilient sector which relies on local demand – can survive political instability, economic downturns | |||
| Micro-Deregulation: Avoid over-regulation. Need protection from sometimes overzealous/capricious city employees. Can be brought into tax net with simple one-time annual estimated turnover tax. | |||
| Secure location & basic amenities is often sufficient: Official site, shed and basic sewage plus access to electricity is often all that is needed. | |||
| Where Micro-Deregulation Has Worked |
| Nepal: A robust small hydro/micro-hydro local industry that has survived instability and civil war | |
| Thousands of micro-hydro installations: Provide shaft power for grinding grain during day and electricity for lighting during the night. | |
| Micro-Deregulation of micro-hydro industry: Below a certain threshold (up to 1MW), require minimum licensing, can set own tariff that is negotiated with users. | |
| Now grown to major sector with a micro & small hydro capacity (including units under construction) of close to 100MW |
| Cogeneration in Sugar Industry |
| Most sugar industries in eastern and southern Africa currently practicing co-generation for own use (using bagasse – a waste byproduct) but very limited power exports to grid | |
| Sugar industry directly or indirectly impact on 4-7 million people in Western parts of Kenya | |
| Sugar mills found in most Africa countries (Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, South Africa, Swaziland and many West African countries) | |
| What works in sugar industry can often be replicated in other agro-industries (agriculture & agro-industries can account for over 50% of a typical sub-Saharan Africa countryÕs GDP) |
| Cogeneration in Sugar Industry |
| Sugar prices in the region facing long-term decline (not withstanding recent increase in prices arising from greater interest in ethanol as replacement for increasingly costly oil) – cogeneration attractive as it offers alternative revenue stream | |
| In Mauritius, power sales revenue for sugar millers recently exceeded that from sugar |
| Cogeneration in Mauritius
Model Example for Regional Replication |
| Slide 9 |
| Slide 10 |
| Slide 11 |
| Slide 12 |
| Slide 13 |
| Revenue Sharing Share Ownership Of Cogen Plants |
| Firm | ||
| Corporate sector 51% | ||
| Strategic Partner 27% | ||
| SIT (Small planters/workers) 14% | ||
| State Investment Corporation 8% | ||
| Continuous | ||
| Corporate sector 80% | ||
| SIT (Sugar Investment Trust) 20% | ||
| Equitable sharing of ownership of and revenue from cogeneration ensures even smallest low-income farmer gets a portion of revenue | ||
| In turn, leads to exceptionally strong & consistent policy support | ||
| Key Policy Lessons & Possible Interventions by Parliament |
| OK to start small (Mauritius started with 1 to 2 MW units) which allows a learning experience and sorting out the kinks. Can set an initial target of up to 5% installed capacity. Higher prices can be justified on basis of importance of diversity, elimination of transmission costs & increased through rural electrification – over time prices can come down with the right incentives | ||
| Easier to convince Governments/utilities to act. Thereafter, it is possible to expand exponential and initiate large initiatives. | ||
| Feed-in tariff is key in promoting co-generation as it provides a strong signal to private sector and financing institutions | ||
| Not wise to leave it only to Regulators. Parliament can play an important role. | ||
| An important addition to feed-in tariff is a standard ÒPower Purchase Agreement (PPA)Ó between agro-industry and power utility. Simplifies negotiations (which can take as long as 7-10years) and removes a major barrier to co-generation investments. | ||
| Revenue sharing mechanism which ensures that large majority of population saw tangible benefits was key to maintain policy support. | ||